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The America in which I grew up in the 1950s seemed so strong, so stable, so sure 
of itself. In the 1960s, this social order was shattered, to a far greater 
degree than has ever been admitted. It may have been the civil rights movement 
and then the Vietnam war and then women's liberation which set it off, but a 
momentum built and swelled into a wave which swept aside all existing 
assumptions and created an atmosphere in which everything was up for grabs.  
Peaceful protests turned into increasingly bitter and violent confrontations. It 
extended into every corner of American society. 
  
By the mid-1970s, the public mood had shifted. The sharp passions of the late-
1960s had subsided and settled into a disillusioned alienation that extended 
even to those who had upheld traditional values against the onslaught of the new 
left. In post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-OPEC America, there was an 
overwheming sense of a society having lost its way and a longing for re-
assurance and re-dedication. Its ability to dominate the world and its very 
belief in its own right to do so had been so deeply undermined as to shake it to 
its very foundations, however much it persisted in trying to pretend that it was 
otherwise. In the 1980s came the backlash. It was time to 'lighten up' and to 
forget about social issues and political problems, or if it was impossible to 
forget, to turn them over to superheroes to sort out once and for all. It was 
the era of Dallas and Dynasty and Rambo and Reagan. 
 
Living in Ireland for the past twenty years, I have come to see America in ever 
sharper relief, in a way I never would have if I had lived there continuously 
all those years. Having grown up in America also makes me see Ireland in a 
different way than I would if I had been born here. But being Irish American in 
this particular way gives me a terrible problem with the whole Irish American 
scene, from which I have become ever more severely alienated. When I go to 
America, I want to touch the real America and not a pretend Ireland. I live in 
the real Ireland, the Ireland of Scrap Saturday and Today-Tonight, and I find 
the sad shabby delusions of the Shamrock Bars too pathetic to puncture and too 
much of a distraction from my preoccupation with feeling the pulse of the real 
America. This was my first time back in ten years and I had so much to do to get 
a fix on the America of the 1990s. 
 
* * * * * 
 
  
There had since been another war. On my way out, Shannon airport was overrun 
with sunburned US soldiers on their way home from the Gulf. New York was 
littered with war paraphenalia and the Socialist Scholars Conference I attended 
there was full of anxiety about the nature of the new world order. Philadelphia, 
a place which was once home, where I had layers and layers of connection to 
American society, was where I would try to get to the bottom of what was 
happening in this society.   
 
The shops were full of all the same sort of 'collateral kitsch' as New York: t-
shirts with the US flag saying "These colors don't run" and with Bush saying 
"Read my lips, Saddam" or, if you were thirsty, you could have Combat Cooler, a 
soda in a camoflage can. The country was on a massive "We're Number 1" marketing 
binge. Flags and yellow ribbons were everywhere.  Cherry Hill, New Jersey gave a 
hero's welcome home to Geoffrey Zahn, the POW we saw on television in abject 
captivity, of whom locals said "He represents the spirit of this war." Hardly 
the old John Wayne type of all-American hero, this said something about the 
distance between then and now. This country was desperate for heroes. 
 
The Gulf war was part of every scenario: it came into every conversation, it was 
a topic on every TV talk show, there was a new local angle in every day's 
newspaper, the iconography of it was part of every scene the eye surveyed. And 
yet, the further I got drawn into America, the less real the Gulf seemed. There 
is something about America which makes the rest of the world seem unreal. It is 
a society very turned in on itself. The discourse about the Gulf war was far 
less about the Gulf than about America. 
 
All was not as it seemed here. Beneath the bravado, beneath the massive support 
for Bush and the Gulf war, there was enormous ambiguity. I asked one of my 
brothers, a truck driver, what he thought of all the flags and yellow ribbons 
around Springfield, our suburban home town. He liked them, he said. Did he think 
the war was right then ? No, he said, he didn't necessarily think that it was 
right, but he thought that, once it had started and the troops were in there, it 
had to be supported. Another brother, a high school teacher, took a harsher 
view: "It was scary. The American people didn't care if it was right or wrong.  
They just wanted to win." In a Cheers type bar, where my sister is well known, 
one young male after another came to speak to me out of earshot of the rest to 
tell me how critical they were of the war, but how difficult it was to stand 
out. Within homes, people confessed to feeling intimidated about not putting out 
yellow ribbons. 
 
Writing in the (US) Guardian, the persistent Noam Chomsky, as active against 
this war as the one in Vietnam, argued that the support for the war was very 
thin, that skepticism and disbelief were barely below the surface, but that each 
person felt alone with it, because most had no forms of association which would 
affirm or mobilise it. 
  
Even within the military, the support was thinner than might be imagined. A US 
Marine officer, who asked me not to give his name, rank and serial number if I 
wrote about him, was scathing about the war and the politicians, who were 
responsible for it, but left ignorant 18 year old kids to deal with it. There 
was more critical thinking and pacifist feeling in the officer corps of the 
armed services than anybody realised, he told me. In a postgraduate course on 
strategic studies for military personnel, much of what was routinely discussed 
would have been considered treasonous 20 years ago, he said. When words like 
exploitation and colonialism came into the conversation, they came from him, not 
me. 
 
The country seemed to be riding high, telling itself that it had kicked the 
Vietnam syndrome, that it was back on centre stage after feeling like a 
spectator to history during 1989, that it has put Europe and Japan and the 3rd 
World back in their place. But the victory was hollow and everybody knew it 
underneath. Already, even before the main victory parade, it had been spoiled by 
the realisation that there had been no real fight, by the pathetic desolation of 
the Kurds, by the returning parasitism of the Kuwaitis, by the resentment of 
veterans of bloody combat in World War II, Korea and Vietnam at the 
glorification of 'a few days in a sandbox' as a war.   
 
But these things were the least of it. The truth is that, although the US has 
re-asserted a kind of political and military supremacy and Hollywood has not 
ceased to assert cultural supremacy, there is no longer the economic base to 
sustain it. Japan is still buying up Manhattan and Hollywood. The truth is that, 
as Rev. David Gracie of the American Friends Service Committee said to me, 
"There is a big vacuum where a sense of national purpose should be". The truth 
is that it is a society that does not believe in itself in the way it pretends.  
It is a society in which the symptoms of decline are unmistakable. 
 
* * * * * 
  
The Spring 1991 issue of the US journal Dissent is a special edition on the 
theme of Social Breakdown in the United States? Signs of Crisis, Symptoms of 
Decay. Articles outline a scenario featuring the specifics of crime, drugs, 
AIDS, homelessness, racism, collapse of cities, crisis in education, S&L 
scandal, declining productivity, but also more general phenomena such as the 
dissolution of social bonds and norms, an unprecedented collapse of meaning, a 
monumental eclipse of hope, a wave of palpable unease spreading across the whole 
spectrum of American society. 
  
Introducing the theme, Irving Howe writes of a malaise, a sense of things coming 
apart, of social problems becoming intractable, of a crisis too deep to be 
corrected by any normal upturn in the economy or quick fix of government 
intervention. One sign of breakdown he advances is the lack of any consensus on 
what even constitutes a social problem, let alone a solution. The spurious 
solutions advanced: 1) to allow the free market to proceed in its majestic 
mystery, 2) to improve 'character', especially the character of the poor and 
oppressed, 3) to acquiesce in the sophisticated resignation of 'the limits of 
social policy', all fail utterly to understand the problem.   
  
The process of breakdown was accelerated in the Reagan years, the years Barbara 
Ehrenreich refers to as The Worst Years of Our Lives in her new book. Yet, there 
is a paradox here, Howe argues, as Reaganism brought about a measure of social 
re-integration, but did so by advancing a set of values (such as extreme 
individualism, open sanction for acquisitiveness and greed, hostility to the 
welfare state and trade unions) that are not workable for any length of time in 
a modern industrial society. 
 
So many symptoms.  Authors come at it from all possible angles and the evidence 
mounts into a fairly compelling case.   
 
The rising popularity of fantasy and the fact that the basic myth of upward 
mobility is no longer rags-to-riches achievement, but winning the lottery, is, 
according to Jim Chapin, a shift from the psychology of work to the psychology 
of lotto, a testimony to the irrational side of capitalism and to a deep loss of 
faith in rationality and in the efficacy of human effort.   
  
Todd Gitlin asks: from where do American Psycho and Die Hard 2 and all the 
murderous stuff that flows down the channels derive their energy, what is their 
power? They are beset by a zeitgeist that slashes and burns. They are driven by 
a cynicism so deep as to defy parody. 
 
But it is not only in the pages of Dissent that you pick this up. It is 
everywhere. Look at the current crop of American films, for example. 
Metropolitan, Avalon, Where the Heart Is, to name just the ones I have seen most 
recently, are pervaded by a strong sense of America having reached its peak and 
hurling now along a downward curve.   
  
Paul Kennedy's book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers describes a cyclical 
process, in which supremacy is established through economic strength, followed 
by military spending to maintain supremacy, followed by economic decline. The US 
and USSR are in decline and Europe and Japan are in the ascendant, the argument 
goes. Barbara Ehrenreich's other recent book Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of 
the Middle Class is another of many recent titles giving expression to various 
aspects of the economics, politics, sociology and psychology of decline. 
  
Indeed I could detect it on every city street, in every suburban mall, in every 
family gathering, in every professional encounter, in every newspaper, on every 
TV show. Walking down Philadelphia's Market Street one day, a dirty, drunken, 
homeless man tumbled about on the sidewalk as I passed. Passing at the same time 
were a gang of black youths, who argued loudly and abusively with each other for 
several blocks about whether it was his own fault or not. There was such a sharp 
edge to the argument, perhaps because none of them could really be sure it 
mightn't some day be them, because none of them really knew whether they could 
trust this society that their own best efforts would be enough. 
 
Talking to Americans of all sorts, especially if you probe, reveals an enormous 
disaffection not far under the surface. Most often it is a list of specific 
gripes that is combined with a heavy but vague and inarticulate angst that is 
bigger than all of them.   
 
Pressing further goes along alternative paths. Blaming politicians or reducing 
large scale sociological problems to small scale psychological ones or simply 
coming against a wall of impenetrability. I asked one long-time friend, a 
journalist writing obituaries, what his political philosophy was. "I don't 
know", he said, "I just know that, when I look around in the world, I don't like 
much of what I see." 
 
There is still such plenitude. There is so much living space. There are so many 
gadgets. Yet there is such massive inequality. The top 20% take in 50% of the 
income, whereas the bottom 20% take in only 3.7%. The 60% in the middle are full 
of anxiety about how to hold what they have. The class divide is bound up with 
all sorts of racial and sexual and generational tensions.   
 
The generational tension is perhaps most symptomatic of decline. There is a 
sense that the middle generation called 'boomers' (ie, born of the post-war baby 
boom) are the best educated and most productive, that with them this society has 
peaked, that they have achieved a standard that not only surpassed their 
parents, but will not be reached by their children. It expresses itself in 
various ways. At its most base, there is resentment in relation to the social 
security system, a fear in the middle generation that the older generation, who 
are living longer, are using up resources that will not be replaced by the 
younger generation. 
 
The tension is not limited to the dynamics of internal distribution. Deep down, 
many know that this nation cannot sustain what proportion of the world's wealth 
that it has been taking. Much of this counrty's sickness, Rev David Gracie said 
to me, is rooted in "trying to hold on to a lifestyle that is a scandal to the 
rest of the world." 
  
There is so much that is just so out of kilter here. There is a long-running 
saga in my own family about a relation who should be committed, but is living on 
her own, drugged up, a danger to herself and everyone around her the moment she 
fails to take the drugs. With the trend to de-institutionalisation of mental 
patients, many are wandering around, destitute and dangerous, on the streets.  
Side by side with this is the lavish care and attention to the exquisitely 
tortured psyches of the rich and the psychoanalysis of their dogs. 
  
This does not feel like a society that has won, a society that represents the 
victory of liberal democracy after the downfall of the alternative system, a 
society that has proved that it is number one after an easy military victory. 
How to penetrate this society and understand what makes it tick ? On one level, 
there is so much distraction, so much chatter, so much clutter. There are so 
many TV shows, so many things to buy, so many hard-sell can't-fail schemes to 
get rich, know yourself, find God, lose weight, buy sex by dialing the 
telephone. There is so much talk about Kitty Kelley's book on Nancy Reagan, 
about what happened at the Kennedy compound at Easter, about a gay palimony suit 
against Merv Griffin, about whether the Mets will beat the Phillies.   
  
On another level, can all these be read as clues to the collective psyche?  What 
sort of society is it that throws up the Simpsons and Mutant Teenage Ninja 
Turtles as its dominant icons?  A campy, cynical, childish, desperate society.  
A society in decline. 
 
These topics and images are nearly all there is left of a common culture and 
large numbers are utterly alienated from them or relate to them only in a 
cynical camped-up way. The fact is that, although Americans share a common 
space, they share less and less in the way of a common culture.  
 
There has been a drastic erosion of civil society. There has been a decline in 
churches, unions, political organisations, even neighborhoods. "There is no 
community anymore" I was told again and again. There is less and less public 
space, even for shopping, which seemed one of the last public places where 
people came out of their separate private spaces. It is not only the big old 
city centre department stores that are deserted, but even the suburban shopping 
malls seem deserted now. Every day piles of catalogues arrive in the post and 
shopping channels on television parade a never-ending supply of goods that can 
be ordered by phone and delivered to the door. 
 
Such areas of public space that do still exist are beset with conflict and 
crisis. Take education. The much discussed 'crisis in education' on one level is 
anxiety about declining standards, about illiteracy and subliteracy, about 
abysmal ignorance of basic geography, for example. There are so many levels of 
irony in the situation. "American students rank near the bottom of the world in 
skills, but at the very top in self-esteem. Yet our formula for self-improvement 
is always more self-esteem, not more knowledge. This gives a certain strange 
quality to discussions of American education." writes Jim Chapin. 
 
 
On another level, there is a bitter debate about curriculum in which many of the 
larger tensions of American society are being played out. Although there never 
was a centralised education system and therefore no common curriculum in the US, 
there was nevertheless a common world view underlying its decentralised 
education systems and there is a pattern in the diverse debate coming in the 
wake of the challenges to this world view in recent decades.   
 
Basically, the right blames the decline in standards on the left, on the 60s 
counter-cultural critique of white, male, Eurocentric (or Amerocentric, more 
accurately) education and calls for a return to classical texts. Allan Bloom's 
The Closing of the American Mind was an instant bestseller in this mode. There 
are complaints about the 'thirdworldisation' of American education and calls for 
a return to a common culture. There is a backlash against black studies and 
women's studies and gay studies and peace studies that is part of a more general 
backlash against anti-racist and anti-sexist and anti-war movements.   
 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, when I was there, carried an article by a final year 
English student at University of Pennsylvania complaining about the 'DWEM-
bashing' (ie, Dead White european Males) that she claimed had become the the 
orthodoxy of her faculty. On many campuses, there is a reaction against what is 
called "PC" (political correctness) and in many institutions there is a reaction 
against speech codes banning racist and sexist language and against affirmative 
action and race and gender quotas. The 'PC' debate currently raging is but the 
latest episode in a long struggle between the explaining and explained classes. 
 
The left, which has become a force in American society at least within the 
universities, does not speak with one voice on all issues in this debate over 
the constitution of knowledge. Many see the absurdities of instructing students 
on the irrelevance of canonical texts they haven't even read and the convoluted 
post-structuralist and post-modernist texts that have replaced them.  They also 
see the dangers of an evasive, non-critical and non-communicating pluralism 
based on the politics of identity. It is a complex debate about how to include 
excluded voices and how to allow for cultural diversity, without indulging 
mediocrity and fragmentation; about how to be critical of received tradition and 
to open it out, while still preserving some sort of a common tradition and a 
dialogue within it. 
  
Twentysomethings, who have come of age in this flabby anything-goes-world of 
protean pluralism, complain that they have no bearings, but it is doubtful that 
any Great Books panacea will bring definition to their diffuse, unfocused, 
confused selves.   
 
There are so few points of common reference any more. It is becoming less and 
less possible to talk to anyone who has read the same book or article, heard the 
same radio programme or even seen the same television programme. It is all so 
fragmented now. I don't know how anyone watches American TV.  It is so broken up 
into such tiny little bits, with such constant interruption for commercials, 
that I can't concentrate on it. I found that I actually knew far more about US 
TV programmes than anyone I met there, but it is very different to watch LA Law 
or thirtysomething in conditions here, where the same programmes seem far more 
coherent here than they do there. 
 
Where will it all end? Some, especially if they are coming forth as candidates 
in the upcoming presidential election, offer hope of some sort of upswing, but 
the odds are against it. "More likely" Gar Alperovitz argues in The Nation "is a 
continuing trend of decay and failure that will slowly destroy all the old 
beliefs, leading first to ever deeper disillusionment, then to profound apathy, 
then to de-legitimation of the existing system, then to anger, and possibly 
after a long dark winter of discontent, to a demand for something different: for 
perestroika, for reconstruction, American style."   
 
Perhaps. Or perhaps not. 
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